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ON THE MATTER OF ROBOT MINDS 





1. Robot Minds Would Matter 
 
In 1999, in Seattle, Washington, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Robots (ASPCR) was formed.  A central tenet of the ASPCR is that sentient robots would have 
“unalienable rights.”1  The ASPCR acknowledges that there are no sentient robots on the planet, 
but claims that given the pace of technological advances, they are “much closer than previously 
thought.”  The mission of the ASPCR is “to ensure the rights of all artificially created sentient 
beings.”  The society’s objective is “to outline a robotic bill of rights, and eventually establish a 
lobbying board to further these rights on the body politic.” 
 
A sentient robot would indeed have inalienable rights.  It would have moral rights.  
Sentience confers a kind of moral status.  Sentient beings are moral patients.  Their sentience is a 
moral consideration in any interaction with them. 2  If, for instance, a robot could feel pain or 
suffer in some way, it would deserve humane treatment. A legal system should protect its moral 
rights.  
 
It is also true that if a robot were to have the kind of mental abilities that would make it a 
moral agent, then it would have moral duties and obligations, and could be held morally 
accountable. 3  What those mental abilities are, exactly, is not a settled matter.  Neither sentience 
nor genuine intelligence is enough.  Many animal species are both sentient and intelligent, yet, of 
known species, only our own includes moral agents. We think the requisite mental abilities for 
moral agency are higher-order intentional states, together with the kind of mental sophistication 
that we normally find only in normal human beings past a certain age.   If a robot had such 
mental abilities, it would be a moral agent, and so subject to moral censure, merit, and praise.4  
 
                                                 
1   All of the quotations in this paragraph are taken from ASPCR’s websites: http://www.aspcr.com/index.html, 
http://www.aspcr.com/newcss_faq.html, http://www.aspcr.com/newcss_robots.html, 
http://www.aspcr.com/newcss_cruelty.html 
2   For evidence that people see sentience as bearing on moral status, see Robbins and Jack (2012). 
3   It would be justifiable to hold such a robot morally accountable in whatever sense normal, adult human beings 
can be justifiably held morally accountable.  We won’t discuss here such thorny issues as whether causal 
determinism is incompatible with moral agency.  (See Nichols and Knobe (2007) for a study on peoples’ view about 
that.) 
4  There is talk of robot agency in the literature; see Allen, Varner, and Zinger (2000); Allen, Smut, and Wallach 
(2005); Sparrow (2007); Wallach and Allen (2008), and Allen and Wallach (2009).   A robot would be an artificial 
moral agent.  But a robot with the requisite mental abilities would be a moral agent period.  In the sense of “artificial 
moral agent” relevant to this essay, the use of the term “artificial” is like the use of that term in “artificial lighting,” 
and unlike its use in “artificial flower.”  An artificial flower is not a flower. Artificial lighting is genuine lighting.  
An artificial moral agent in the sense relevant here is just a moral agent that, in addition, happens to be an artifact; 
similarly for an artificial moral patient. 
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What matters to whether a being is a moral agent or patient is just what, if any, mental 
abilities the being has.  Moral status is conferred by mental abilities alone.  That is one reason it 
matters deeply whether a robot has mental abilities.  
 
There is a basic general principle here that can be stated as a supervenience thesis: There 
can be no difference with respect to general status as a moral agent or moral patient without a 
difference in mental abilities.5  Robots that are both moral agents and moral patients would be 
full participants in the sphere of moral relations.  At present, all known persons are human 
beings.  But although such robots would not be human beings, they would be persons. 
 
The ASPCR likens itself to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (ASPCA).  In 1823, the philosophy of mind and ethics began to join hands in support of 
the moral rights of animals when Jeremey Bentham made has now famous remark: “The 
question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they think?, but, Can they suffer?” (1823: ch.27, fn.).  
The idea that sentient beings are moral patients eventually started to spread, and in 1866, in New 
York City, the ASPCA was formed.   
 
When the ASPCA was formed, there was, as there is today, many suffering and 
mistreated animals.  At present, there are no artifacts that suffer. There are no artificial moral 
patients or agents, because there are no sentient or genuinely intelligent artifacts.  That is a point 
with which the ASPCR agrees.  But if, as the society anticipates, robots with sentience are on the 
way in the not too distant future, then the ASPCR’s objective is urgent —how urgent depends on 
how soon such robots are to be expected if research continues unabated.  Has the time come to 
join the cause of the ASPCR?  
 
2. Mental Words Matter 
 
If a robot were sentient, it would have moral rights.  It is also true that if, as a 
panexperientialist might claim, a piece of jello is sentient, then it too would have moral rights.  
Indeed, if a witch cast a spell that made a broom stick sentient, then the broom stick would have 
moral rights.  However, jello doesn’t have mental abilities.  And no one can cast a spell that 
makes a broom stick sentient.  Whether a robot could be sentient is a quite another matter.  The 
ASPCR takes the pace of AI research to be such that we should expect sentient robots sooner 
rather than later.  If the society is right about that, its mission is truly urgent indeed. 
 
It was reported in The New York Times (November 17, 2003) that Hans Moravec, a 
leading roboticist at Carnegie Mellon University, stated: “I’m confident we can build robots with 
behavior that is just as rich as human being behavior.” He added: “You could quiz it as much as 
you like about its internal mental life, and it would answer as any human being.”  Moravec 
wasn’t just making an off-hand comment to the press.  In his Encyclopedia Britannica Online 
article, “Robots” (2003), he stated that if the current pace of robotic development continues, 
“robots are likely to parallel the evolution of vertebrate intelligence to the human level, and 
probably beyond, within fifty years.”6  In his Scientific American article (Moravec 2009), he 
                                                 
5   This is intended as a strong supervenience thesis that holds with conceptual necessity (see McLaughlin 1995).   
6   Retrieved from http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/project.archive/robot.papers/2003/robotics.eb.2003.html.  In 
Moravec (2016), he predicts human-level intelligent robots by 2050. 
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predicted that robot intelligence will surpass our own before 2050.  If Moravec’s prediction is 
correct, there will be robots with human-level intelligence or greater within 33 years.   
 
If that prediction can be trusted, the urgency of the ASPCR’s objective cannot be 
exaggerated, especially given the glacial pace at which countries deal with looming crises (think 
of the response to global warming).  We should begin to act now. The robotics industry should 
be put on notice that if it ever develops robots with intelligence even approaching human-level 
intelligence, it will not own them, and will never be permitted to sell them. The sale of beings 
with intelligence approaching human-level intelligence would be slaving.7  If the government 
failed to enact laws to prohibit the sale of such robots, even revolution would be called for were 
that the only way to stop it.  To avoid this, we maintain that the government should shut down 
any research project with even an outside chance of developing such robots. 
 
But to echo Ebenezer’s question to the most fearsome of the three Ghosts: Are these 
shadows of things that will be or are they shadows of things that may be only? 
 
Before sounding the alarm, it should be noted that in the 2003 version of his 
Encyclopedia Britannica article, “Robots,” Moravec also says, in the context of reporting on the 
history of robotics: “By the late Twentieth Century automata controlled by computers could also 
think and remember.”8 If a being can actually think, then it is genuinely intelligent.  Having the 
ability to think suffices for being genuinely intelligent.  Thus, if we’ve had, for decades, 
machines that can think, the Holy Grail of the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has in fact been 
in our hands for decades.  
 
There are, to be sure, some truly impressive robots. The LEGO robot, made of Legos and 
a small computer, can solve the rubric’s cube from any starting arrangement to the completion of 
the puzzle in approximately 3.46 seconds.  Mitsubishi-Heavy Industries Corporation’s robot 
Wakmaru is capable of responding appropriately to over 10,000 spoken words, and can reliably 
detect up to 10 faces.  The Los Angeles Times employs an algorithm, Quakebot, for producing 
news stories about earthquakes.  Although it would be costly to do, we already have the existing 
technologies to put a mechanism that can execute Quakebot inside a humanoid robot, one made 
to look just like, say, Seymour Hersh, and to connect it with the robot’s motor system.  We could 
then have what we might call “the Hershbot” sitting in a cubical, typing the story on a laptop.   
 
AI has much to boast about. The Holy Grail of AI is not one of them.  There are, 
currently, no thinking machines.  Moreover, from what we have been able to gather from 
experts, we don’t now see either sentient or genuinely intelligent robots on the horizon.  And we 
regard it as an open question whether either sentient robots or robots with human-level 
intelligence will ever be technologically possible.  Indeed, we regard it as an open question 
whether such robots are even nomologically possible (compatible with Mother Nature’s laws).  
                                                 
7  As has often been pointed out, the term `robot’ comes from Karel Ĉapek’s 1920 Czech language science fiction 
play R.U.R..  In the original Czech, “robata” means “forced labor,” and is derived from “rab,” which means “slave” 
(Free Online Dictionary). 
8   http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/project.archive/robot.papers/2003/robotics.eb.2003.html.  We are very pleased 
to report that this claim does not appear in Moravec (2016). 
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For all anyone now knows, such a robot might be like a machine that can transmit information 
faster than the speed of light, something that Mother Nature doesn’t permit.   
 
Mental words matter.  If “thinking” or “sentience” is used in some proprietary AI sense 
not to be confused with the senses of those terms in ordinary English, then that should be made 
very explicit.  Otherwise, it will inspire well-meaning groups such as the ASPCR.  
 
If such AI mental talk is intended as literal, then those so talking should keep in mind that 
such prognostications are a double-edged sword.  They might entice financial support, but the 
edge that cuts against AI research can do so in two ways. Promises can create expectations that 
won’t be met.  And there are promises no one should be allowed to keep. 
 
In our discussion of robots in this essay, we’ll use both mental terms and moral terms 
literally.  The issue of robot mentality is inseparable from the issue of robot rights.   
 
We stand in staunch opposition to the manufacture and sale of robots that have 
intelligence that even approaches human-level intelligence.  We do so on the grounds that it 
would be slaving.  We have, however, no objection at all to the sale of Mitsubishi-Heavy 
Industries Corporation’s Wakmaru robots.  They are now priced at $143,000.  We only wish we 
could afford one ourselves.   
 
We see no urgency in carrying out the ASPCR’s mission. We don’t think the United 
Nations should be mobilized.  We feel no need to contact our congressperson or to alert the 
press.  We don’t even feel that we should join the ASPCR.  The reason is that we don’t share the 
ASPCR’s assessment of the future of technology.  Nanotechnology could perhaps develop to the 
point where a humanoid robot with the information storage capacity and information processing 
powers of IBM’s Watson, and made to look just like, say, Lieutenant Commander Data of Star 
Trek,9 could stand behind a podium with former Jeopardy!10 Champions and win the grand 
championship.  But despite its outward appearance, such a humanoid robot would no more have 
moral status than does Watson.  It would be neither a moral patient nor a moral agent. 
 
The world has already been put on alert about the (alleged) possibility of 
superintelligence, and the singularity.  Nick Bostrom’s (2014) book was a New York Times best 
seller.  The singularity doesn’t keep us awake at night. We believe that it now falls under the 
category of science fiction.  Of course, what is at one time science fiction can later become 
science fact.  Please, then, wake us up if, and when, there is a line of research that there is serious 
reason to think has even a remotely outside chance of developing superintelligence.  We’ll then 
do all that we can to work to help to stop it.  But as for the current AI research of which we are 
aware, we’re all for it, and enthusiastically encourage investment in it. 
 
                                                 
9  Star Trek: the Next Generation is a US science fiction television series, which ran from 1987-1994, that was 
created by Gene Roddenberry. It included as a character an android named Lieutenant Commander Data, noted for, 
among other things, his (Data is a male android) brilliance. 
10  Jeopardy! is a US television game show created by Merv Griffin.  IBM’s computer Watson competed on 
Jeopardy! on February 14-16, 2011, and won the grand championship.  
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We’ve announced that the robots soon coming down the pipes will lack mental abilities.  
No doubt some members of the ASPCR will not feel reassured.  No doubt some people will think 
that we are misinformed, naïve, or simply ignorant.   Should cold water be thrown in our faces to 
wake us up from a dogmatic slumber?  Are we naïve or ignorant in thinking that there will be no 
sentient or human-level intelligent robots in the foreseeable future?  Unfortunately, we won’t be 
able to settle those questions here.  But later we’ll clarify our position, and offer some 
considerations in defense it. 
 
For now, however, we want to turn to some genuinely pressing moral and social issues 
concerning extant robots and ones that will soon arrive, issues that arise even if, as we believe, 
such robots will be devoid of mentality. 
 
3. Why It Really Matters That the Robots Are Coming 
 
There is a tsunami of robots on the way.  It is estimated that by 2020, there will be 31.2 
million robots on the planet.  That could be a low-ball estimate.  The South Korean government 
is aiming to have a robot in every Korean home by 2020 (Chamberlin 2010).  The population of 
South Korea reached 50 million in 2012.  If the South Korean government comes anywhere in 
the ball park of its goal, the number of robots worldwide will far exceed 31.2 million in 2020. 
But, in any case, to put the more conservative number of 31.2 million into perspective, in 2015 
the population of Australia was 23.8 million and the population of Canada was 35.8 million. It 
could well turn out that in just three years from now, the number of robots on the planet will 
exceed, perhaps far exceed, the population of Canada. 
 
Currently, the majority of the robots are Roombas, home vacuum cleaners developed by 
iRobot Corporation.  But soon cloud-connected humanoid robots designed for service, including 
home care, will be entering the lives of people in affluent countries in unprecedented numbers.  
They’ll provide valuable services indeed. And they should be of no concern to the ASPCR.  
They will no more have moral rights than does a Roomba, which itself no more has moral rights 
than does an old fashion Sears and Roebucks push vacuum cleaner.  They will lack mental 
abilities.  Let’s hope that such robots will be reasonably priced and widely available. 
 
But even though such robots will be neither moral agents nor moral patients, they’ll 
present a host of moral and social issues.  The use of robots in war, and how a self-driving car 
should be programmed to respond to various kinds of dangerous situations raise moral issues 
(Allen and Wendell 2009).  Then, there are such pressing social issues as the potential effects on 
employment.  Smith and Anderson (2014) tell us that experts are divided over whether the flood 
of robots soon to come our way will increase or decrease employment in industrialized nations 
by the year 2025.  But there are very serious grounds for worry.  Industrial robots will lead to 
further decline of factory positions.  There are now reasonably priced robots that can weld.  We 
anticipate robots that can dig coal 24 hours a day, 365 days a week.  It is estimated that there 
may be as many as 10 million self-driving cars on the road by as early as 2020 (Greenburg, 
2016).  Never mind potential loss of taxi driver jobs; in the US, more males are employed as 
truck drivers than in any other occupation (Smith and Anderson 2014).  Moreover, robots will 
soon fill many service industry and white collar jobs.  Those are fields in which most women in 




The soon forthcoming humanoid service robots, specifically, present a plethora of moral 
issues that are all their own.  The issues have to do not with our effects on them, since they’ll 
lack mentality, and so can be neither harmed nor wronged. The issues have to do with their 
effects on us.   
 
Eyes (real or artificial), faces, human-like or animal-like form, human-sounding voices, 
and matters such as biological motion influence our initial gut reactions to robots.  We react 
viscerally to humanoid robots, which is different from the way we react to an ipad, even when 
the humanoid robot no more has genuine intelligence than does the ipad.  It is a different 
experience to have a cloud-connected humanoid robot that seems to look into your eyes when 
answering your questions than it is to have Siri on your ipad answering your questions.  Because 
of such visceral reactions, although it would be wrong to kick a Roomba in anger in front of a 
child, it would be far worse to kick or slap a humanoid robot in front of a child.  That’s not 
because either extant or soon forthcoming humanoid robots deserve humane treatment.  If you 
owned one, there would be nothing morally wrong per se with you shutting it off, or even 
disassembling it and selling its parts.  Slapping such a humanoid robot in front of a child would 
be wrong because of how observing such an interaction might affect the child.  Also, we should 
now be concerned with such matters as how a child’s growing up with a humanoid robot that 
seems to unquestionably obey its orders might influence the child’s social interactions with other 
people the child regards neither as peers nor as having higher social standing.  We don’t want 
children to grow up thinking that they can just trump over such people. 
 
Faces, eyes, and the like can make it appealing to interact with a robot.  The roboticist 
Mashahiro Mori (1970/2012) anticipated, however, a phenomenon he dubbed “the uncanny 
valley.” As robot appearance becomes more and more human-like, our gut reactions to robots 
change.  We start to cease finding them appealing and start to enter the uncanny valley in which 
the robots seem creepy.  Studies indicate that we initially react at a gut level as we would to a 
distorted human face or body (Mac Dormon and Ishiguro 2006; Seyama and Nagayma 2007; 
Tinwell, Grimshaw, Abdel Nebi, and Williams 2011; Saygin 2012).  Especially disconcerting is 
the mismatch between their outward appearance and their behavior. It seems that because of their 
outward appearance we, at some level, expect them to behave like normal humans, expectations 
that are then dashed (Saygin 2012). This failure of such unconscious expectations to be met is 
manifested in our consciousness by the cognitive feeling of creepiness.  Realistic looking 
humanoid robots, initially at least, can seem creepy.   
 
Uncanny valley reactions have even been found in monkeys (MacPherson 2009).  The 
experiments with monkeys were done with animations.  Psychologists find that we too have 
uncanny valley reactions to animations (Burliegh, Schoenherr, and Lacroix 2013).  Many 
children who viewed the move The Polar Express11 found the realistic appearance of the 
animations creepy.  Fiona, in the movie Shriek,12 was initially animated in a very realistic 
appearing way, but children at the prescreening found the character so creepy that the production 
company had Fiona redone to make her appear less realistic.13  
                                                 
11   An American film directed and produced by Robert Zemeckis and distributed by Warner Brothers. 
12   An American film directed by Andrew Adamson and Vicky Jenson and produced by PDI/Dream Works. 




Although there are some very realistic looking humanoid robots, the humanoid service 
and homecare robots soon on the way won’t look much like humans.  For sales reasons, industry 
doesn’t want to manufacture creepy robots.  To avoid inducing the feeling of creepiness and 
instead to induce warm and fuzzy feelings in us, robotic companies tend to produce cute, toy-like 
appearing humanoid robots, such as, for instance, NAO, a cloud connected humanoid robot 
developed by Aldebaran Robotics.  NAO was inducted into the Carnegie Mellon University 
Robot Hall of Fame in 2012.  A 2004 inductee, Honda’s ASIMO (Advanced Step in Innovative 
Mobility), has been described as looking like a boy in a spacesuit, because of its size and shape.  
ASIMO robots could be made to look exactly like boys in regular boys’ clothing.  But, despite 
their truly impressive seventeen degrees of freedom of movement, their movements are so 
different from normal human movements that if they looked like real boys in ordinary clothing, 
they would creep us out. Roboticists don’t want to creep us out.  They want to sell us robots.  (At 
the time of this writing, a NAO is priced at $8,000, and an ASIMO, which costs a million dollars 
to make, can be leased for a month for $150,000.  Again, we wish we had the money!) 
 
Roboticists can now make extremely realistic looking robots, but typically don’t in order 
to avoid the uncanny valley.  There is ongoing work to develop robots that rise above the 
uncanny valley in that they move smoothly in ways that appear very human-like, and make 
sounds indistinguishable from a human voice. Work under the directorship of Hiroshi Ishiguro at 
the Intelligent Robotic Laboratory at Osaka University in Japan deserves note, because of how 
realistic looking and sounding the robots are. Ishiguro’s robots, however, are mainly controlled 
by “teleporting,” that is, by receiving signals from a person at a terminal, rather than behaving 
autonomously, and so to that extent are just fancy marionettes. Their voices, too, are the voices 
of the teleporter.  Still, it looks as if research could very well result in humanoid robots that don’t 
just look, move, and sound like humans, but that also extensively act autonomously.   
 
It was 20 years from the time that a prototype ASMIO took its first step until ASIMOs 
were able to walk up and down stairs, run, hop on one foot, kick balls, shake hands, open jars, 
and pour coffee.  If and when ASIMOs have smooth, fluid human-like movements and human 
sounding voices, and so rise above the uncanny valley, they may be made to look just like real 
boys, dressed in boys’ clothing.  Given that the robots will not be sentient and will have nothing 
even remotely approaching human level intelligence (neither of which would be required for 
them to have very realistic human appearances, smooth human-like movements, and human-
sounding voices), their sale wouldn’t be slaving.  There is no need to have Honda, the 
manufacturer of ASIMO, cease and desist.  On the contrary, Honda should be encouraged.  But it 
is important to recognize that such robots would raise concerns about humanoid-human 
interactions to an entirely new level.  
 
Think in this connection of whether special orders will be taken to custom build robots 
that look and sound exactly like a certain person (say, an ex-spouse, a co-worker, an 
acquaintance, or a celebrity).  That, we believe, should be legally prevented —at the very least 
without the person in question’s legal consent.   
 
A recent survey conducted in Great Britain by Martin Smith, the Head of the Mobile 
Robot Research Unit at the University of Middlesex in England, found that 1 in 5 people, a 
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mixture of males and females, said they would be willing to have sex with a humanoid robot 
(reported in Lytton 2014).  Ian Yeoman and Michelle Mars (2012) predict that by 2050 
Amsterdam’s Red Light District will be staffed by android prostitutes, which, they point out, 
would remove health concerns, and the exploitation of human prostitutes.  Consent is not an 
issue where so called “sexbots” are concerned, because they are devoid of any mentality.  But 
might a person’s interactions with sexbots affect how that person interacts with other people?  If 
so, that is an enormously serious and deeply troubling concern. 
 
Julie Carpenter (forthcoming) points out that sexbots could be used as sex surrogates by 
couples that have long-distance relationships, where one partner partly controls via teleporting 
the sexbot that is interacting with the other partner.  Such robots would just be fancy sex toys, 
and so may seem harmless.  But there are serious potential complications, especially as the 
sexbots rise above the uncanny valley, which they very may will.  To note one, David Levy 
(2008) predicts that by the year 2050, not only will many people be having sex with humanoid 
robots; many people will fall in love with them and want to marry them.  The state of 
Massachusetts, he predicts, will be the first to legalize human-robot marriage.   
 
Here we see shadows not of things that may be only, but of things that perhaps will 
indeed be (except, we think, for the part about Massachusetts).  In fact, there are already actual 
cases of deep emotional attachments formed in robot-human interactions.  There are actual cases 
of soldiers risking their lives on the battlefield to save bomb detecting robots with which they 
have become emotionally attached (Carpenter 2016).   
 
Anthropomorphizing is thus already a serious concern.14  It comes easily and naturally to 
us, and has been found in every culture (Eplsey, Waytz, and Caciopppo 2007). In Europe in the 
Middle Ages, animal trials were common, and in some areas occurred as late as the nineteenth 
century.  Pigs were often put on trial for murdering children (Evans 1906: Ch.1). (Historians 
suspect that in many such cases the parents in fact killed the child, so as to have one fewer mouth 
to feed.) If the pigs were convicted, they were often put to death by hanging; but if the pig’s act 
was deemed especially evil, it was buried alive instead (Evans 1906: 138). Insects too were 
sometimes put on trial. There were cases in which captured locusts were put on trial for 
destroying crops (Evans 1906: 135). As late as 1866, in Pozega-Slavania, after the conviction of 
some locusts that were captured red-handed eating crops, the locusts were “put to death by being 
thrown into the water with anathemas on the whole species” (Evans 1906: 136).  Sometimes, 
though, mercy was shown.  In 1457, a sow and her piglets were tried for murdering a child 
(Evans 1906: 346).  Although the sow was convicted, the piglets were acquitted, on the grounds 
that they were not mature enough to make informed choices.    
 
Although anthropomorphizing is a serious concern, we don’t now anticipate a repeat of 
scenarios like the ones above with humanoid robots (that are in fact neither sentient nor 
genuinely intelligent).  Folk views have evolved too much since such dark times (right?).   Still, 
there are many currently pressing moral and social concerns about humanoid-human interactions.  
We’ve listed some, but the list goes on, and on, and on.  And no doubt issues will arise that we 
don’t now anticipate.  The point to note, though, is that the moral concerns are about how 
                                                 
14  George Henry Lewes (1875) coined the term “anthropomorphize.” 
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humanoid-human interactions will affect the humans involved.  The robots could be damaged or 
destroyed, but neither harmed nor wronged.  
 
Robot-ethicists are now engaged in examination of the issues, as well as in the study of 
what new laws it would be best to enact, given the kinds of robots already here, and that there is 
good reason to think will soon be coming (see the essays in Lin et.al. 2011).  There are pressing 
moral and social issues aplenty.  Given the tsunami of robots on the way, a course devoted to the 
field of robot-ethics (often called “robo-ethics”) urgently deserves a place in the curriculum.   
 
Robot-rights seem not to be much of an issue in the field, because it seems to be fairly 
widely assumed in the field that the robots in question will be neither sentient nor genuinely 
intelligent.  We think that’s a very sensible assumption, at least for the foreseeable future.  
Members of the ASPCR and some members of the AI community, however, see matters 
differently.  If they are right, then we think robot-rights should be at the very top of the agenda in 
robot-ethics.  Indeed, the other issues, as important as they are, would pale in comparison.  Since 
the issue of robot rights is inseparable from the issue of robot minds, let’s return to the matter of 
robot minds. 
 
4. Matter and Robot Minds 
   
We agree with the ASPCR’s assumption that the mere fact that a robot will be an artifact 
is not itself a reason to think that it could not be sentient or even have normal human-level 
intelligence.15  Suppose that a wet-life lab someday succeeds in constructing DNA and RNA 
from basic molecules, and then eventually constructs a duplicate of a normal human sperm and a 
duplicate of a normal human egg from basic molecules.  Suppose further that the sperm fertilizes 
the egg, and that the fertilized egg is placed in an environment in which it starts to divide.  We 
can imagine that it is implanted in a woman’s uterus, or instead (since we’re only imagining) 
placed in a machine that functions like a woman’s womb. Nine months later, the woman gives 
birth (or the being is removed from the machine).  Call the being “Art.” The intrinsic physical 
properties of Art will be those of a normal human baby.  No physical examination would reveal 
that Art is not a human baby in the sense of not being a member of the species Homo sapiens.  
Art would be an artifact.  Despite being an artifact, Art would, we maintain, have the mental 
capacities to be a moral patient; and if Art developed in a normal social environment, then Art 
would come to have the mental abilities to be a moral agent.   
 
We know of no reason to think that Art is nomologically impossible, or even forever 
beyond human technological possibility.  We know of no reason to deny that scientists will ever 
have the technology to construct physical duplicates of a human sperm and a human egg in a lab 
just from basic molecules, have the sperm fertilize the egg, and then grow a baby.  Although Art 
would be an artifact and not a member of the species Homo sapiens, Art would be a moral agent 
and a moral patient.  Indeed, Art would be an artificial person, an artifact, and, in addition, a 
person.  That Art is an artifact would be completely irrelevant to Art’s moral status as a person. 
                                                 
15   To fix our ideas, we can think of normal human-level intelligence as involving the capacity (the ability to acquire 
the ability) to speak and understand a natural language.  Although some robots are now being marketed as speaking 
several languages (e.g., English, Japanese, and German), no extant robot can actually speak a natural language.  




To be sure, a robot is not just an artifact, it is a machine.  That, however, is not itself a 
reason to think a robot could not have mental abilities that confer moral status. One of the 
founders of the iRobot Corporation tells us in his essay “I, Rodney Brooks, Am a Robot”: 
 
I, you, our family, friends, and dogs—we are all machines.  
We are really sophisticated machines made up of billions and 
billions of biomolecules that interact according to well-defined, 
though not completely known, rules deriving from physics and 
chemistry.  The biomolecular interactions taking place inside our 
heads gives rise to our intellect, our feelings, our sense of self. 
(Brooks 2008: 1) 
 
No immaterial soul or mind separates us from material beings.  We have minds, but that is just to 
say that we have mental abilities.  We are also wholly composed of a system of physico-
chemical mechanisms.  Given that, it seems fair enough for Brooks to say that we are machines.  
We are sentient and intelligent.  So, a machine can be sentient and intelligent.  The mere fact that 
a robot is a machine is thus not itself a reason to think it could not have the kind of mentality 
required to be a member of the moral community.  Nor is the fact that a robot is both an artifact 
and machine.  Art would be both an artifact and a machine, but a person nonetheless, and so a 
member of the moral community. 
 
Still, we, our families, friends, and dogs are, of course, not the kinds of machines around 
which debate swirls concerning the possibility of machine sentience and intelligence.  The 
hypothetical kinds of machines around which debate swirls are supposed to be very different in 
material composition and structure from us and from our dogs, and indeed from any known life 
form.  Brooks is well aware of that.  He adds to the remarks above that there is “no reason” why 
a machine made of “silicon and steel” couldn’t “exhibit genuine human-level intelligence, 
emotions, and even consciousness” (2008: 1).   
 
To repeat, this time with emphasis: moral status is conferred by mental abilities alone.  
Other factors matter only insofar as they matter to a being’s having mental abilities. 
 
But a point we want to underscore is that there is an issue about how matter matters to 
mental abilities.  We’ll be concerned here only with robots made of silicon and steel.  Such 
robots would be very different in material composition and structure from any known life form.  
All known life forms are carbon-based.16  Scientists haven’t ruled out the possibility of silicon-
based life forms.  But for chemical reasons, it is fairly widely thought that if there is silicon-
based life, it will likely be only simple forms of life such as bacteria and archaea.  Contra 
panpsychists, we maintain that there is no reason to think that bacteria or archaea, whether 
                                                 
16  Of course, carbon is an ingredient of steel.  Let’s take it that carbon figures in the robots in question only as an 
ingredient of their steel skeletal structures.  What really matters is whether the would-be seat of mental abilities is 
silicon-based.  We ourselves see no reason whatsoever to doubt that a cyborg, with a body made of silicon and steel, 
but with a normal human brain would both have human level intelligence and sentience.  (See Heubner (2010) for 
supporting evidence that “the folk” think that too.) 
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carbon-based or silicon-based (if such there be), are either sentient or intelligent.  But we must 
simply leave open here whether there are more complex forms of silicon-based life. 
 
The issue, in any case, is not whether a silicon-based being could be a living being, but 
rather whether it could be either sentient or intelligent.  Of course, the only known sentient or 
genuinely intelligent beings are living beings.  But until December 17, 1903, the only known 
flying things were certain living beings, yet on that day in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, the first 
plane took flight.  Flying things need not be living things.  
 
Being a living being is certainly not an a priori requirement for being a thinking or a 
feeling being.  Even if, as the chemical evidence seems to indicate, a silicon-based robot could 
not have a metabolism, it remains whether a silicon-based robot could be either sentient or 
intelligent.17 More generally, neither a silicon-based sentient robot nor a silicon-based robot with 
human-level intelligence (or greater) can be ruled out a priori.  There is no condition C such that 
it is a priori that being sentient or having even human-level intelligence requires meeting C, and 
also a priori that something made of silicon and steel would fail to meet C.  
 
Of course, there is no end of things whose existence cannot be ruled out a priori, yet 
there is not even the slightest reason to expect will ever actually exist.  Some such things are 
even nomologically impossible.  We shouldn’t expect a machine that transmits information faster 
than the speed of light, because such a machine is nomologically impossible.  We are, however, 
aware of no dispositive case either that genuinely intelligent or even sentient robots are 
nomologically impossible, or that they are nomologically possible.  And no such case will be 
attempted here.18 
 
The ASPCR assumes not only that such robots are nomologically possible, but also that 
they will be technologically possible in the foreseeable future.  A main point that we have been 
highlighting thus far is just how much is at stake if the society is right about that.  If the society’s 
prognostication is a reasonable one, then we maintain it is now urgent to take up the society’s 
cause.  But the prognostication doesn’t seem reasonable to us.  Should cold water be thrown in 
our faces? 
 
5. On the Matter of Robot Sentience 
 
It is one issue whether a robot made of silicon and steel could be genuinely intelligent, 
another whether it could be sentient.19   
 
We think that genuinely intelligent robots may well be in our future.  However, robots 
with intelligence exceeding, matching, or even approaching normal human intelligence is 
another, far more controversial, matter.  Perhaps, though, even silicon-based robots with human-
                                                 
17   But see Ziff (1959) and Long (1994) for arguments that robots couldn’t feel because they aren’t living beings. 
18   For the record, one us, McLaughlin, favors the view that silicon-based sentient robots are not only nomologically 
impossible, but also metaphysically impossible.  But that will be neither assumed nor argued for here. 
19   See McLaughlin (forthcoming) for a defense of the view that human-level intelligence and self-consciousness 
don’t require sentience, and so that even if there could not be a sentient silicon-based robot, the issue would remain 
whether there could be a silicon-based robot with human-level intelligence and self-consciousness.  We’ll say more 
about sentience shortly. 
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level intelligence or greater await us in the future. (If so, let’s hope they don’t arrive by space 
ship on a mission from alien beings to conquer us, something that cannot be ruled out.) No one 
really knows.  We think, however, to put it in as light-handed a way as we can, that it is more 
questionable whether there could be a sentient robot made of silicon and steel than it is whether 
there could be a high-level intelligent robot made of silicon and steel.  Material composition and 
structure could matter to feeling in a way that it doesn’t matter to intelligence.  We’ll hereafter 
focus on the prospects of robot sentience, putting the issue of intelligence aside. 
 
The term “sentience” is used in more than one way.  As we use the term, the fact that a 
being can see, hear, and smell, for instance, wouldn’t entail that the being is sentient.  In contrast, 
the fact that a being has visual experiences, or auditory experiences, or olfactory experiences 
would entail that the being is sentient.  By “sentience” we mean (to use a philosophical term) 
phenomenal consciousness.  A being is phenomenally conscious just in case it is like something 
to be that being (Nagel 1974).  Material objects experience acceleration and the like, but 
phenomenally conscious beings have subjective experiences —experiences that are like 
something for them as subjects.  A being is phenomenally conscious just in case the being is able 
to have subjective experiences.  Visual experiences, auditory experiences, and olfactory 
experiences are subjective experiences: they are like something for the experiencer.  Seeing 
doesn’t require having visual experiences.  Not only are there cases of complete blindsight that 
involve seeing without visual experience (Celesia 2010), there are creatures that can see but that, 
we believe, don’t have visual experiences.  Butterflies can see; they even have color constancy 
(Kinoshita, Shimada, and Arikawa 1999; Kinoshita and Arikawa 2000).  But we don’t think that 
butterflies have visual experiences, or indeed subjective experiences of any sort.  There is, we 
think, something that it is like to be bat, but we don’t think there is anything that it is like to be a 
butterfly.  If a robot had visual experiences, it would be phenomenally conscious.  But building a 
robot that can see doesn’t require building a robot that has visual experiences.  (Arguably, we 
already now have robots that can in some sense see.)  The feeling of pain is another paradigm 
case of a subjective experience, for whether a feeling is a feeling of pain depends on what it is 
like for a being to have the feeling.  If a being can feel pain, then the being is phenomenally 
conscious.  Building a robot that can feel pain would thus suffice for building a phenomenally 
conscious robot.  
 
The subjective experiences of a being are a moral consideration in interacting with the 
being, precisely because they are like something for the being.  Thus, any phenomenally 
conscious being has the status of being a moral patient.  Hereafter, we’ll use “phenomenal 
consciousness” rather than “sentience.” 20   
                                                 
20   Sytsma and Machery claim that the folk don’t conceive of subjective experiences as experiences that are like 
something for the subject (2010: 229).  They maintain that, instead, “for the folk, subjective experience is closely 
linked to valence” (2010: 299).  They tell us that mental states have valence if and only if they have hedonic value 
for a subject, that is, if and only if they are, for instance, pleasurable (and so have positive hedonic value), or 
disagreeable (and so have negative hedonic value) (2010: 299).  We don’t see how an experience could have 
hedonic value for a subject without the experience being like something for the subject.  But an experience can be 
like something for a subject without having a hedonic value, unless of course the null-hedonic value is included as a 
value, in which case subjective experiences all trivially have hedonic values.  We can’t properly discuss here the 
case that Sytsma and Machery make for their position.  We note, though, that we think that they misinterpret the 
result they get that people are inclined to attribute seeing red to a robot they describe, Jimmy, but are disinclined to 




6. Not An A Priori Matter 
 
It is a deep and difficult issue how a wholly material being could be phenomenally 
conscious.  (It is also a difficult issue indeed how a being with an immaterial part, if such is 
possible, could be phenomenally conscious.)  Still, there is, we believe, good reason to hold that 
a wholly material being could be phenomenally conscious.  We each know in our own case, or at 
least should know in our hearts, that we are phenomenally conscious.  Moreover, on the 
evidence, we are wholly material beings.  On that basis, we maintain that there is good reason to 
believe that a wholly material being could be phenomenally conscious.  Indeed, we maintain that 
we are such beings.  The issue remains whether a being made of silicon and steel could be 
phenomenally conscious.     
 
Analytical (or logical) behaviorism for phenomenal consciousness attempts to answer the 
question of what makes a being phenomenally conscious (have subjective experiences).  It 
answers that what makes a being phenomenally conscious is that it has the right sort of pattern of 
dispositions to peripheral (or outward) behavior. 21 Were it true, then we could at least see a 
priori that whether a robot made of silicon and steel could be phenomenally conscious turns just 
on whether it could have a pattern of dispositions to peripheral behavior of the kind in question.  
On the assumption of analytical behaviorism, if it is logically possible for a robot made of silicon 
and steel to have such behavioral dispositions, then it is logically possible for such a robot to be 
phenomenally conscious. If it is physically possible for such a robot to have such behavioral 
dispositions, then it is physically possible for such a robot to be phenomenally conscious. 
Moreover, whether such a robot will ever be technically possible for us would turn just on 
whether we could ever develop the technology to build, out of silicon and steel, a robot with the 
relevant behavioral dispositions.  On this view, material composition and structure are relevant to 
whether a being is phenomenally conscious.  But they are relevant only insofar as they are 
relevant to whether the being has the requisite behavioral dispositions. 
 
Analytical functionalism, a progeny of analytical behaviorism intended to improve on its 
flaws (most notably, by accommodating the holism of beliefs and desires), also attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                             
they think Jimmy has visual experiences, and so subjective experiences in our sense.  In one sense of “sees red,” 
seeing red is having a visual experience of red.  But in another sense of seeing red, to see red is to relationally see 
the redness of something.  (David Rosenthal drew a similar distinction when commenting on a paper of Machery’s 
at a conference held at CUNY.)  Seeing red in the latter sense doesn’t require having a visual experience of red, or 
indeed any subjective experience (in our sense) at all.  Butterflies can see the yellowness of something.  But, as we 
noted, we seriously doubt that they have subjective experiences of any sort.  The reason is that we doubt that it is 
like anything to be a butterfly.  Sytsma and Machery acknowledge that someone might object to their position in this 
way, by claiming that “sees red” has more than one sense, and that in the sense in which folks think Jimmy sees red, 
seeing red doesn’t require having a subjective experience.  But they respond that if “sees red” were ambiguous in 
this way, we should expect people participating in the study to divide roughly evenly on the question of whether 
Jimmy sees red, some taking the question one way, others taking the question the other way.  But we find no such 
divide.  Most folks think that Jimmy sees red.  We think the reason that is so is that the scenario Sytsma and 
Machery describe involving Jimmy invites (what we’ve called) the relational reading of “sees red,” the reading on 
which seeing red doesn’t require having an experience that is like something.   That said, what is relevant to our 
discussion is Sytsma and Machery’s result that people tend to be disinclined to attribute pain to Jimmy.   As will be 
apparent in due course, we’ve found similar results. 
21   We take the apt term “peripheral behavior” from Dennett (1987). 
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answer the question.  Were analytical functionalism true for phenomenal consciousness, then we 
could at least see a priori that whether a robot could be phenomenally conscious turns just on 
whether it could have the right functional organization, a functional organization that can be 
gleaned from folk psychology using the method of Ramsification, and that is describable just in 
physical and topic neutral terms (Lewis 1966).22  Whether a phenomenally conscious robot made 
of silicon and steel will ever be technologically possible would turn just on whether we could 
ever develop the technology to build a robot with the functional organization in question out of 
the materials in question.  Material composition and structure would be relevant only insofar as 
they are relevant to a being’s having that kind of functional organization.  For an analytical 
behaviorist, internal functional organization is relevant to phenomenal consciousness only 
insofar as it is relevant to what dispositions to peripheral behavior an individual has.  But 
analytical functionalism allows that there can be a difference in (relevant) functional 
organization without a difference in dispositions to peripheral behavior. It is compatible with 
analytical functionalism, but not with analytical behaviorism, that two beings could have exactly 
the same dispositions to peripheral behavior, yet one be phenomenally conscious and the other 
not.   
 
If analytical behaviorism for phenomenal consciousness were true, it would be 
analytically true that a being with exactly the same dispositions to peripheral behavior as a 
phenomenally conscious being would be phenomenally conscious.  Thus, if a certain being is 
phenomenally conscious (e.g., some normal human being), then any robot with the same 
dispositions to peripheral behavior as that being would be phenomenally conscious.  If analytical 
behaviorism were true, we could focus on whether a robot could have the same dispositions to 
peripheral behavior as some or other being we know is phenomenally conscious.  If analytical 
functionalism were true, it would be analytically true that a being that is a folk psychological 
functional isomorph of a phenomenally conscious being would be phenomenally conscious.  
Thus, if it were true, we could focus on whether a robot could be a folk psychological isomorph 
of some or other being we know is phenomenally conscious.   
 
But both analytical behaviorism and analytical functionalism are false, at least for 
phenomenal consciousness.23 We have, though, nothing to add to the well-known reasons for 
rejecting both of those theories of phenomenal consciousness.24 
 
7. A Nomological Matter 
 
We think that there is no condition C such that it is a priori that being phenomenally 
conscious requires meeting C, and also a priori that something made of silicon and steel would 
fail to meet C.  It is, however, also the case, we believe, that there is no condition C* such that it 
is a priori that whatever meets C* is phenomenally conscious, and also such that we now know 
or even have good reason to believe that a robot made of silicon and steel could meet C*.  Still, it 
                                                 
22   Topic neutral terms include terms such as “cause,” “effect,” “part,” and “whole,” vocabulary available to 
physicalists and dualists alike. 
23   We’ll take no stand here, however, on whether analytical functionalism is true for mental states such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. 
24   We should note that not everyone is convinced that analytical functionalism is false for phenomenal 
consciousness (see Phelan and Buckwalter 2012). Here we’ll just assume that it is. 
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remains that one could come to a reasonable view, all things considered, about whether a robot 
made of silicon and steel could be phenomenally conscious.  Coming to such a view is beyond 
the scope of this essay, however.  There are some somewhat less daunting issues that bear on 
whether a silicon-based robot could be phenomenally conscious.  We’ll turn to some 
momentarily. 
 
Even some leading opponents of analytical functionalism (for phenomenal 
consciousness) maintain that having the kind of functional organization with which analytical 
functionalism associates phenomenal consciousness nomologically (but not metaphysically) 
suffices for being phenomenal consciousness.25  David Chalmers (1996), for instance, seems to 
have held that view.26   
 
Some theorists hold a similar view as concerns patterns of dispositions to peripheral 
behavior.  Daniel Dennett, in his essay “The Message Is: There is No Medium,” tells us:  
 
I unhesitatingly endorse the claim that necessarily, if two organisms are exactly 
behaviorally alike, they are psychologically exactly alike (1993: 923).   
 
We take it that the modal force of “necessarily” here is nomological necessity (not a stronger 
kind of necessity).27  By “behaviorally alike,” he means “have the same dispositions to peripheral 
behavior.”  Although he speaks of organisms, his discussion gives the clear indication that he 
would generalize it to all beings. On his view, the message is that there is no medium, because 
the internal bases for the dispositions don’t matter to a being’s psychology, except insofar as they 
matter to the being’s having the appropriate behavioral dispositions.28   
 
Consider, then, the following supervenience thesis: 
 
It is nomologically necessary that if two beings are exactly behaviorally alike, 
then they are exactly alike with respect to phenomenal consciousness. 
 
Let’s call this thesis “nomological behaviorism for phenomenal consciousness,” or “nomological 
behaviorism,” for short.  Given nomological behaviorism and the fact that we are phenomenally 
                                                 
25  We assume here that laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. 
26   We are uncertain whether Chalmers continues to hold it, given that he now seems to embrace panprotopsychism 
(Chalmers 2013).  Given his embrace of that view, he should regard it as a wide open question whether a robot made 
of silicon and steel could be phenomenally conscious.  Given panprotopsychism, settling that question will have to 
await the discovery of proto-mental properties, and the determination of how they can combine to produce 
phenomenal consciousness.  A test case for whether a would-be theory of the proto-mental is correct is whether it 
counts humans and other animals as phenomenally conscious.  Whether it counts certain silicon-based robots are 
phenomenally conscious is not a good test case; whether silicon-based robots could be phenomenally conscious is 
spoils for the theory of phenomenal consciousness that is victorious on other grounds. 
27   See Dennett’s (1994) response to McLaughlin and Hawthorne (1994).  
28   Dennett’s (1971) original intentional systems theory was a kind of instrumentalistic panpsychism.  He later 
stressed the importance of the presence of “real patterns” (1991).  On his view, the real patterns that matter to what 
mental states a being has are patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior.  Internal factors such as functional 
organization can be relevant, but only insofar as they are relevant to what patterns of disposition to peripheral 
behavior the being has. (For further discussion, see McLaughlin and Hawthorne 1994.)  
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conscious, it follows that certain patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior nomologically 
suffice for phenomenal consciousness.29   
 
We’ll focus here just on nomological behaviorism.  (A discussion of nomological 
functionalism must await another occasion.)  We’ll so focus, because it is our suspicion that 
something like the assumption of nomological behaviorism for phenomenal consciousness lies 
behind the confidence of those in the AI community who declare that silicon-based sentient 
robots are just down the road.  (Recall, for instance, Moravec’s statement: “I’m confident we can 
build robots with behavior that is just as rich as human being behavior.”)  Although this is just 
speculation, the assumption might also be behind the concerns of the ASPCR; for, as we’ll see, if 
nomological behaviorism is true, then there is reason to believe that sentient robots will indeed 
soon be developed.   
 
The move to nomological behaviorism for intelligence has already been made by some in 
the AI community.  Alan Turing (1950) famously proposed a test, the Turing test, for whether a 
machine is genuinely intelligent. It is a behavioral test, focused just on verbal behavior.  Ned 
Block (1981) compellingly argued that passing the Turing test is not a logically or conceptually 
sufficient condition for a machine’s being genuinely intelligent.  He also maintained that it is not 
nomologically sufficient for being genuinely intelligent. Stuart Shieber (2014), an AI researcher, 
acknowledges that Block has shown that passing the Turing Test is not a logically or 
conceptually sufficient condition for being genuinely intelligent, but maintains that it is 
nomologically impossible for the kind of unintelligent machine Block describes to pass the test.  
It is Shieber’s position that Block has given us no reason to doubt that passing the Turing Test is 
a nomologically sufficient condition for being genuinely intelligent. We’ll put that matter aside, 
since our concern is with phenomenal consciousness, not intelligence.  
 
It would be open to someone to claim that it is nomologically necessary that any machine 
that passes the Turing test is phenomenally conscious.  We think that claim is mistaken (see 
McLaughlin forthcoming).  But be that as it may, we won’t be concerned here with the Turing 
Test as a test for phenomenal consciousness.  Neither being genuinely intelligent nor being 
phenomenally conscious requires passing the Turing Test.  Many animals are both intelligent and 
phenomenally conscious, yet, of known beings, only humans that can use a natural language 
could pass the Turing Test.  Moreover, as a test for whether a robot is phenomenally conscious, 
the Turing Test muddies the waters, because of peoples’ respect for first-person authority about 
states of phenomenal consciousness. 30  Further, even if passing the Turing Test were a 
nomologically sufficient condition for being phenomenally conscious, that wouldn’t vindicate 
nomological behaviorism.  The reason is that that would be perfectly compatible with there being 
two beings with exactly the same dispositions to behave, one of which is phenomenally 
conscious and the other of which isn’t.  
                                                 
29   It should be mentioned that if laws linking dispositions to behave with states of phenomenal consciousness  are 
supposed to be fundamental laws, rather than laws that hold in virtue of other laws and conditions, then nomological 
behaviorism would be a kind of ontological emergentism, with states of phenomenal consciousness ontologically 
emerging from patterns of dispositions to behave.  (Similar remarks apply to nomological functionalism.)  For 
discussion of ontological emergence, see McLaughlin (1992); for further discussion of the status of would-be laws 
linking dispositions to behave with states of phenomenal consciousness, see McLaughlin (2000). 
30   For a discussion of how that could mislead people where the issue of robot phenomenal consciousness is 




8. Is Behavior All That Matters? 
  
If nomologicalism behaviorism were true, then all that would be required to make a 
phenomenally conscious robot made of silicon and steel would be to make a robot of silicon and 
steel that has exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as some or other 
phenomenally conscious being.  We think that if nomological behaviorism were true, then there 
would be very good reason indeed to think that phenomenally conscious silicon-based robots 
may soon be coming our way, and so the ASPCR’s cause would be truly urgent.   
 
  We don’t think that silicon-based robots with the same patterns of dispositions to 
peripheral behavior as a normal, adult human beings will soon be coming our way.  Indeed, they 
could turn out to be nomologically impossible.  But even if nomological behaviorism is true, 
given the enormous complexity of human verbal behavior, it would be utter folly for an AI 
research team to now try to develop a phenomenally conscious robot by trying to develop a robot 
with the behavioral dispositions of a normal, adult human being.  The sensible thing would be to 
try to develop a robot with the behavioral dispositions of a nonverbal being that is phenomenally 
conscious. No one thinks that only language users are phenomenally conscious.  Congenitally 
deaf humans that have never learned to sign are phenomenally conscious. Human neonates, 
infants under six weeks old, are too.  They feel pain, pressure, hunger, thirst, have sense 
experiences, and so on (see, e.g., Anand and Hickey 1987).  The behavioral dispositions of 
neonates might well not prove so complex that it would take a revolutionary breakthrough to be 
able to duplicate them in a silicon-based robot.  It is very dubious that insects are phenonmenally 
conscious.31  But koalas, for instance, are. It would be far less daunting to try to develop a 
silicon-based robot with their behavioral dispositions than it would be to try to develop one with 
the behavioral dispositions of far more active animals such as squirrels or beavers, or far more 
cognitively complex animals such as apes or porpoises.  Given nomological behaviorism, it is 
nomologically necessary that if a robot made of silicon is steel has the same dispositions to 
peripheral behavior as a certain koala, then the robot is phenomenally conscious if and only if the 
koala is.  
 
A silicon-based neonate robot or koala robot with the same dispositions to peripheral 
behavior as a normal neonate or koala seems not so terribly far from AI researchers’ grasp.  
Indeed, given the current pace of technology, if we were nomological behaviorists, we’d be 
ready to sign up as members of the ASPCR.  Neonates and koalas are phenomenally conscious, 
and so moral patients.  If nomological behaviorism were true, robot neonates and robot koalas 
would be moral patients too, for exactly the same reasons.  But we’re not nomological 
behaviorists.  We wouldn’t be concerned about the welfare of silicon-based robots with the 
behavioral dispositions of either neonates or koalas.  We don’t, for instance, think that someone 
who destroyed a silicon-based neonate robot with the same dispositions to behave as a neonate 
should be charged with murder, since in doing that, they would not be ending a mental life.  
Thus, although we don’t think that such robots are far out of reach, we’re still not ready to join 
the ASPCR.  We reject nomological behaviorism. 
  
                                                 
31   In addition to the fact that insects have very few neurons, there is also a ton of behavioral evidence that they 
don’t feel bodily sensations (see Eisemann, Merit, Cribb, Webb, Jorgensen, and Zaluki 1984).  
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Nomological behaviorism is a supervenience thesis.  All that it takes to show that a 
supervenience thesis is false is a single counterexample.  If the thesis is a logical or conceptual 
supervenience thesis, then a counterexample need be only a logically or conceptually possible 
case.  If the thesis is a nomological supervenience thesis, then a counterexample need be only a 
nomologically possible case.  To show that nomological behaviorism is false, all that is needed is 
a single nomologically possible case of two beings with the same dispositions to behave but that 
differ with respect to phenomenally consciousness.   
 
Normal neonates and koalas feel sensations and have sense experiences, but silicon-based 
robots with the same patterns of dispositions to behave would not feel sensations or have sense 
experiences.  They would not be moral patients, because they would not be phenomenally 
conscious.  We regard the nomological possibility of silicon-based neonate robots and silicon-
based koala robots as counterexamples to nomological behaviorism. Thus, we maintain that 
nomological behaviorism is false.32   
   
Of course, there can be disputes over whether a case is a genuine counterexample.  There 
are three possible ways that nomological behaviorists might try to deny that these are 
counterexamples.  First, they might claim that it is nomologically impossible for there to be a 
silicon-based robot with the peripheral behavioral dispositions of either a normal neonate or a 
normal koala.  In addition to that claim lacking any empirical support, we don’t think our 
nomological behaviorist opponents would make it.  Second, they might claim that neither 
neonates nor koalas are phenomenally conscious.  In response, as we understand phenomenal 
consciousness, feeling pain, for instance, suffices for being phenomenally conscious, since that is 
like something for the pain sufferer.  Neonates and koalas feel bodily sensations such as pain. 
They can suffer.  The main issue, moreover, can be recast just in terms of feeling sensations.  
Beings that feel sensations are moral patients.  Finally, they might insist that such silicon-based 
robots would feel sensations in whatever sense neonates and koalas actually do.33 This last 
response is the one on which we’ll focus.  
 
Given that such robots could very well soon be on the way, nomological behaviorists 
ought to join the ASPCR; for if such robots would feel sensations in whatever sense normal 
neonates and koalas actually do, they would be moral patients, and so have moral rights.  As 
we’ve repeatedly noted, we aren’t ready to join. 
 
A proper attempt to adjudicate our dispute with nomological behaviorists would take us 
into the deep, troubled waters concerning the place of phenomenal consciousness in nature.  As 
we indicated, we won’t go there here. In what remains, we have just a small fish to fry. But it is, 
we think, a nutritious one.  We want to consider what the folk think about the kinds of cases in 
question.  That won’t of course be the last word on the issue.  The folk can wrong.  But, for 
reasons we’ll give later, folk judgements shouldn’t be ignored in developing a theory of 
phenomenal consciousness.  
 
We conducted two studies to try to determine what the folk think about the kinds of cases 
in question.  In what remains, we’ll first present the studies, and then turn to a discussion of 
                                                 
32   We think that nomological functionalism is false, too.  But, as we indicated, we will not argue that here. 
33   Compare Dennett’s position in Dennett (1978). 
 19 
 
them.  After that, we’ll conclude with some remarks about the relevance of experimental 
philosophy studies to robot ethics. 
 
9. Study 1 
 
In our study, we presented a series of cases, each involving two beings with the same 
outward appearance and the same dispositions to peripheral behavior, but with different material 
compositions and structures.  This was our Individual (Robot/Biological Organism) variable.  
Although our main interest is the two cases of neonates/robot-neonates and kolas/robot-koalas, 
we also included two cases involving organisms more biologically remote from us than koalas 
(one an insect, the other a plant), and robots with their behavioral dispositions.  Our aim was to 
see whether we’d find similar results for those cases.  Our Type variable thus varied whether the 
being was a neonate, koala, Venus flytrap, or mantis.  Finally, we asked about feeling certain 
sensations: pain, itches, warmth, and pressure.  That was our State variable.   
 
In an effort to make the cases seem as realistic as possible, participants were given the 
following cover story: 
 
Kymoto, a Japanese company, is the leading developer of artificial intelligence.  
The company was commissioned to create robots that are very similar in outward 
appearance and outward bodily behavior (their bodily movements, eye movements, 
breathing-like movements, facial expressions, the sounds, including crying sounds, they 
make, and so on) to human neonates, human babies less than 4 weeks old. The purpose of 
the project was to develop such robot-babies for use by teenagers in order to provide 
them with highly realistic training for neonate care, with the hope that such training will 
cut down on teenage pregnancy and, in any case, prepare them for future parenthood.  
The project was successful far beyond initial expectations.    
The robot-babies the company produced are very different in material 
composition and internal structure from human neonates.  The robot-babies are made of 
steel and the chemical element silicon, substances that do not naturally occur in living 
things.  Rather than having neurons, they have silicon-chips. They are silicon-based, 
rather than carbon-based as living things are. But they are so very similar in outward 
appearance and outward bodily behavior to human neonates that people cannot tell 
whether or not they are human neonates by observing their appearance and behavior, not 
even when interacting with them over the course of a full day in the ways that attentive 
parents normally interact with neonates.  Their mouths make sucking movements when in 
contact with a nipple; and if, for instance, they are pinched, they would emit sounds 
indistinguishable from a neonate’s cry. If a fly lands on their nose, their nose would 
crinkle; and if they are in the sun, moisture would form on their foreheads.  Indeed, 
although the robots are powered by an internal long lasting battery, they even contain a 
mechanism that coverts ingested milk into solid material that looks like and smells like 
neonate feces, and also into liquid material that looks like and smells like neonate urine, 
so that the robots’ diapers need to be changed. Of course, unlike neonates, they don’t 
grow, but that wouldn’t be noticed over the course of a day or even over a few days. 
Kymoto’s work on the robot-babies built on enormously successful earlier work in which 
they first developed silicon-based robot-Venus flytraps, and then over a series of years, 
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silicon-based robot-praying mantises, followed by silicon-based robot-koalas.  These 
robots are indistinguishable in their behavior and outward appearance, respectively, from 
Venus flytraps, praying mantises, and koalas.  But they are very different from their 
biological counterparts in material make up and internal structure.  
 
Participants were then told that they would read descriptions of various Kymoto robots 
and particular things of the biological kinds that they were developed to match in outward 
appearance and outward behavior.  They then read a brief description of the things they would be 
considering.  Here’s an example from the neonate cases: 
 
Jane-R is a silicon-based robot-baby that looks as if it is an identical twin of Jane, a 
normal 2 week old human baby.  Jane-R and Jane are, moreover, so similar in their 
behavior that one would be unable to tell by observing their behavior on any given day 
which is Jane-R and which is Jane.  
 
The same basic description was used for the Venus flytrap, koala, and mantis cases.  
After reading this, participants were then presented with an event and asked about whether the 
robot and biological organism would feel certain sensations.   
 
Here are the events and questions about sensations for the neonate cases: 
 
Pain: 
Event. Jane-R and Jane are both stung by a bee. 
(a) Jane-R feels a sensation of pain.  
(b) Jane feels a sensation of pain. 
 
Itch: 
Event. A fly lands on the nose of Jane-R and a fly lands on the nose of Jane. 
(a) Jane-R feels a sensation of an itch. 
(b) Jane feels a sensation of an itch.   
 
Warmth: 
Event. Jane-R and Jane are in the sun on a warm day. 
(a) Jane-R feels a sensation of warmth. 
(b) Jane feels a sensation of warmth. 
 
Pressure: 
Event. A person presses on Jane-R’s arm and a person presses on Jane’s arm. 
(a) Jane-R feels a sensation of pressure. 
(b) Jane feels a sensation of pressure. 
 
Participants made ratings for both the robot and the biological organism on a 6-pt scale anchored 
with 1=strongly disagree, and 6=strongly agree.  Similar events and probes were used for the 




Following all this, participants were given three comprehension questions.  These are the 
comprehension questions for the neonate cases (the same basic questions were used for the 
Venus flytrap, koala, and mantis cases): 
 
Comprehension 1. Jane is a normal human neonate. 
Comprehension 2. Jane-R is a robot neonate created by Kymoto. 
Comprehension 3. Jane-R and Jane are indistinguishable in outward appearance and 
outward behavior. 
 
Participants were given the option to select “yes” or “no” for each comprehension question.  
They then answered the following question that served as a manipulation check: 
 
Manipulation Check: Jane-R and Jane are very different in material composition and 
internal structure. 
 
Participants responded by selecting “yes” or “no”.   
 
Finally, participants were asked whether the story about Kymoto seemed to be at least a 
possible scenario, and they responded with either “yes” or “no.” 
 
The type of entity being considered— neonate, Venus flytrap, koala, and mantis— was 
randomized.  State was presented in a fixed order, and people were always asked about the robot 
first and then the biological being.  Together, the study was a 2 (Individual: Robot, Biological 
Organism) x 4 (Type: Neonate, Venus flytrap, Koala, Mantis) x 4 (State: Pain, Itch, Warmth, 
Pressure) within-subjects design. 
 
One hundred participants were drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in 
Qualtrics.  After removing those who missed one or more comprehension questions, there was a 
total of 81 participants. 
 
First, our manipulation check was highly effective with 97.5% (72/81) saying that the 
robot and biological being were very different in material composition and internal structure. 
Second, looking at the effect of Individual, Type and State on judgments about feelings we found 
a main effect of Individual, F(1, 80)=249.36, p<.001, ηp2=.757, Type, F(2, 240)=59.69, p<.001, 
ηp2=.427 and State, F(3, 240)=27.03, p<.001, ηp2=.253.  These main effects were qualified by a 


















Finally, we found that 78% of participants said the scenario describing Kymoto was at 
least possible. 
 
10. Study 2 
 
In Study 1, we found that people tended to differ markedly in their judgements about the 
silicon-based robots and their biological organism behavioral counterparts.  But perhaps people 
have different judgments depending on whether they’re prone to giving more unreflective or 
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more reflective responses.  It may be that people who are prone to more reflective responses will 
be more likely to think that there is little difference between the respective robot and biological 
organism, and accordingly make similar judgments for both. 
 
To investigate this, we used the same materials as in Study 1 and followed the same 
procedure.  To check peoples’ tendency to give more unreflective or more reflective responses 
we included, at the end of the study, the Cognitive Reflectivity Test (Frederick, 2005). The 
expectation is that those who pass the CRT will be more prone to giving reflective responses 
than those who fail the CRT.  This investigation involved a mixed design with Individual, Type, 
and State as within subjects’ factors and CRT being treated as a between-subjects factor. 
 
Two hundred people participated in the study, and after removing those who missed one 
or more comprehension questions, a total of 170 participants remained.  First, our manipulation 
check was again highly successful (95% said “yes”), and we also found that 74% of participants 
thought the scenario describing Kymoto was at least possible. Second, looking at whether there 
were differences in responses between people who passed the CRT and people who didn’t,34 we 
found only a significant three-way interaction between Individual, Type and CRT, F(3, 
504)=5.13, p<.05, ηp2=.017.   
 
As can be seen in the graphs below, on the whole, those who passed the CRT tended to 






                                                 
34 Those who gave an incorrect answer for one or more CRT items were grouped into “Not Pass,” while those who 





11. Discussion of the Studies 
 
These studies provide evidence that people tend to think that there can be a difference 
with respect to feeling sensations without a difference in behavioral dispositions.  They provide 
evidence that nomological behaviorism runs counter to what people tend to think.  On the 
evidence, it looks as if people don’t think or presuppose that material composition and structure 
are relevant to feelings only insofar as they are relevant to behavioral dispositions.  It looks like 
considerations of material composition and structure can override considerations of sameness in 
behavioral dispositions.  Indeed, an examination of the graphs in Study 1 shows a trend. More 
people thought that the Venus flytrap has the feelings in question than thought that the robot-
koala or even the robot-neonates do. The robot-neonate is just like the neonate behaviorally.  The 
Venus flytrap is very different behaviorally. We speculate that more people thought the Venus 
flytrap has feelings than thought the robot-neonate had them, because they regard a Venus 
flytrap as more similar in material composition and structure to us and to animals than a robot-
neonate or robot-koala; though that speculation would have to be tested.  In any case, on the 
evidence from these two studies, people tend to think that material composition and structure can 
make a difference to whether a being is able to feel certain sensations, even when it makes no 
difference to behavioral dispositions.  Moreover, the effect of considerations of material 
composition and structure was even more pronounced with participants that passed the CRT. 
 
A nomological behaviorist might well respond that at very best we have just shown what 
preconceived notions people have about these matters.  These preconceived notions, the 
nomological behaviorist might say, are simply mistaken.  To be sure, they may be mistaken.  
One of the cognitive benefits of both scientific and philosophical investigation is to rid ourselves 
of mistaken preconceptions.   We ourselves think that there is no reason to think that a Venus 
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flytrap feels sensations, and that there is serious reason to doubt that a mantis does. 35  But a 
theoretical case needs to be made that peoples’ preconceptions are mistaken.  Our studies 
provide evidence that nomological behaviorism runs counter to what people think.  The onus is 
on nomological behaviorists to show that people are wrong.  It will have to suffice for us just to 
note here that that is something we believe nomological behaviorists will be unable to do.  
 
  Peoples’ preconceived notions about phenomenal consciousness are relevant to the 
project of constructing a theory of phenomenal consciousness.  Analytical behaviorism and 
analytical functionalism are false for phenomenal consciousness.  There are precious few, if any, 
a priori connections between our concepts of phenomenally conscious states and our physical 
and topic neutral concepts.  (That’s why panexperientialism cannot be refuted a priori.)  
Although we cannot pursue this general issue here, we note that we believe that folk psychology 
has a relevance to scientific cognitive psychology that folk physics, for instance, doesn’t have for 
physics.  As concerns phenomenal consciousness, any credible theory of it will have to establish 
a reflective equilibrium between our considered judgements about phenomenal consciousness 
and the physical facts.  The best we can hope for is a theory that is both credible and, on grounds 
of overall coherence and overall simplicity with respect to our total theory of the world, superior 
to competing theories.  It may well be that peoples’ preconceived notion about the relevance of 
material composition and structure to having feelings will be vindicated by such a theory of 
phenomenal consciousness.  That’s our bet. 
 
Some other studies have produced results that compliment ours.  Knobe and Prinz (2008), 
for instance, conducted studies that provide evidence that ascriptions of states of phenomenal 
consciousness are sensitive to the physical properties of something in a way that ascriptions of 
other mental states are not.  (See also Knobe (2008), and Huebner (2010).) 
 
We think our results are relevant to assessing John Stuart Mill’s would-be solution to the 
epistemic problem of other sentient beings. He asked: 
 
[B]y what considerations am I led to believe, that there exist other sentient 
creatures…I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, 
first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the 
antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and 
other outwards signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused 
by feelings (Mill, 1865). 
 
Mill emphasizes the fact that his fellow human beings have bodies like him. That’s an appeal to 
similarity in material composition and structure.  He notes that outward signs such as behavior 
are relevant just because they are, in our own case, causal effects of feelings.  Our studies seem 
to provide some supporting evidence that people indeed think that material composition and 
structure matter to whether a being has feelings, and not just insofar as they matter to the being’s 
behavioral dispositions.  Thus, our results go at least some way toward vindicating Mill’s 
solution to the problem of other sentient beings.36 
                                                 
35    Mantises have minds, but not phenomenally conscious minds. There is, we think, nothing that it is like to be a 
mantis.  For further discussion of insects, see Eisemann et.al. (1984), and McLaughlin (forthcoming).  




Our results don’t, however, support the claim that having phenomenal consciousness 
conceptually requires having a biological body.  Moreover, we think there is no such conceptual 
requirement.  It is coherently conceivable that a silicon-based robot could have phenomenal 
consciousness.  (It is a separate issue whether phenomenal consciousness metaphysically 
requires a biological body, but that is not an issue we can address here.)   
 
Cartesian substance dualists maintain that a disembodied individual could have 
phenomenal consciousness.37  We reject that substance dualist view, but we don’t claim that our 
results tell against it.  It should be noted, however, that a substance dualist might well hold that 
certain kinds of material constitution and structure are required for states of a brain to be directly 
causally linked with states of phenomenal conscious.  Even a Cartesian dualist might hold that 
immaterial phenomenally conscious minds are directly causally linked to biological brains, but 
not to brains made of silicon and steel.  
 
An important issue that our results might bear on is the role of System 1 and System 2 
processes in the attribution of states of phenomenal consciousness.  We have two sorts of 
cognitive reactions to humanoid robots: gut reactions and considered judgments.  Our gut 
reactions result from System 1 processing, which is fast, automatic, and unconscious (Kahenman 
2011). We mentioned earlier, in our discussion of the uncanny valley, that there has been 
considerable work on how eyes (real or artificial), faces, human-like or animal-like form, human-
sounding voices, and matters such as biological motion influence our initial gut responses to 
robots.  Those are System 1 reactions. Less is known about the kind of considerations that play a 
role in System 2 processing, which is slow, sometimes effortful, consciously accessible 
reasoning (Kahenman 2011). 
 
  Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols (2011) propose what we regard as a System 1 model 
of consciousness attributions.  They call it “the AGENCY model.” According to the model, “an 
entity’s displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive 
behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity” (2011: 
331).  They also take these same simple features to automatically trigger dispositions to attribute 
intentionality to the entity (propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and the 
like).  They note that reactions to the classic 1944 video by Heider and Simmel suggest that even 
the slightest hint of biological motion of simple, geometrical figures —two triangles and a circle 
on a computer screen— can do so (cf., Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols (2011): 329-30).  
 
We’re inclined to think they may well be right that, to put it a bit differently from the way 
they do, System 1 processes responding to the simple features in question act to incite both 
attributions of phenomenally conscious states and attributions of propositional attitudes.  But 
System 2 reactions are another matter.  It may be that beliefs about material composition and 
structure can forestall the activation of dispositions to attribute phenomenally conscious states, 
                                                 
37   Studies by Phelan and Buckwalter (2012) support, we believe, the view that people rely on folk psychological 
platitudes connecting beliefs, desire, and the like with states of phenomenal consciousness in attributing the latter 
states, even when they take themselves to be imagining disembodied individuals.  We take that as a reason (though 




without forestalling the activation of dispositions to attribute propositional attitudes.  For 
instance, beliefs about similarity in material composition and structure to us might lead us not to 
attribute states such as feeling pain to humanoid robots, even when those same beliefs may give 
us no pause in attributing beliefs, preferences, and intentions to them.   
 
Participants in our studies had to read through a detailed scenario, and were under no 
time pressure, and so could reflect on the questions.  If the judgements of the participants who 
passed the CRT result from System 2 reasoning, rather than having been prompted by System 1 
processing, then our results bear on the above issue.  We cannot say with any confidence that the 
participants in our study were relying on System 2 reasoning. But their answers to the questions 
were not what one might expect were they expressing knee-jerk System 1 reactions.  
 
It would be valuable to have information about whether or not people think that 
considerations of material composition and structure matter to phenomenal consciousness only 
insofar as they matter to folk psychological functional organization.  But that must await another 
occasion.38 
 
12. Experimental Philosophy Studies and Robot Ethics 
 
There has been a great deal of experimental philosophy studies aimed at understanding 
the folk conception of the mind for the purpose of contributing to our understanding of the mind 
itself.  We regard that as a worthy enterprise, for reasons that we’ve already mentioned.  But of 
course experimental philosophy studies of the folk conception of mind can contribute in other 
ways, too. 
 
As we noted, robot-rights is not much of an issue in the field robot ethics, because it is 
assumed, very plausibly in our view, that the robots soon to come into our lives will be neither 
sentient nor intelligent.  Still, the impending flood of humanoid robots will bring pressing moral 
and social issues in its wake.  Information concerning our reactions to humanoid robots is 
essential to the field.  And matters are too urgent to wait for a consensus about what the correct 
theory of phenomenal consciousness is. 
 
There is a wealth of information about our System 1 reactions to humanoid-robots, 
though more information would be valuable.  There is far less information about our System 2 
reactions.  Given that it is essential that we, as a society, begin an education campaign about the 
coming humanoid-robots, the latter information would be valuable indeed. We can think of quite 
a few studies that could be conducted that would provide very useful information for robot-
ethicists and policy makers.  No doubt other researchers can think of such studies too.  We hope 
that other such studies will be conducted. 
 
                                                 
38   Since one would want to conduct the study using subjects without any background in the philosophy of mind or 
cognitive psychology, we think it will be difficult to construct a proper questionnaire.  The reason is that it would 
have to convey the technical idea of folk psychological functional isomorphism, and the fact that the relevant 
functional organization is describable in physical and topic neutral terms.  From our experiences in teaching 
undergraduate philosophy of mind courses, that is no easy matter.  The idea of two beings with the same dispositions 
to behave is much easier to get across. 
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 That expression of hope, however, doesn’t reveal how strongly we feel about the need for 
such studies.  We think that circumstances demand further examinations of peoples’ reactions to 
humanoid robots.  Because of the tsunami of humanoid robots rapidly approaching all of our 
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